中圖分類號：D923文獻標識碼：ADOI:10.19358/j.issn.2097-1788.2024.09.012
引用格式：陳思敏，蔡唱.論人工智能民事主體資格之否定［J］.網絡安全與數據治理，2024，43（9）：71-76，83.

The discussion on the denial of civil subject qualification of artificial intelligence

Abstract： The civil subject qualification of artificial intelligence is an important problem to be solved urgently in the development of artificial intelligence. First of all, recognizing the qualification of artificial intelligence as a civil subject undermines the central position of human beings, and violates the humanistic spirit contained in the civil subject system. Artificial intelligence for human beings doesn′t have independent will, can′t achieve the same status as a civil subject, and doesn′t meet the requirements of the concept of equality. Secondly, artificial intelligence is reproducible and lacks individual differences, so it can′t engage in civil activities in its own name. Artificial intelligence is controlled and decided by human beings. It doesn′t have independence and independent property, and can′t bear civil liability independently. In all, Artificial intelligence doesn′t meet the elements of civil subjects. Finally, artificial intelligence only has technical rationality, which is different from human rationality. So it lacks the rational basis of civil presupposition subject.

Key words : artificial intelligence; civil subject qualification; humanistic spirit; equality and rationality; independent